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Hildebrandt’s Onlife World: 
Public Goods, Design and Politics 
Charles D. Raab* 
Abstract 
This article draws attention to some important themes in Hildebrandt’s book and refers 
to other literature that adds to their practical importance. It highlights the way in which 
social relationships may be understood in terms of private, social and public spheres. 
Discussing “inbetween” phenomena as seen analogously in defensible-space physical 
design, and the concepts of “affordance” and “resilience,” it considers the importance 
of these concepts to the design of an onlife infrastructure preserving the Rule of Law. 
It asks whether the scenario of an individual’s situation in the “smart” environment 
leaves undeveloped the possibility of an onlife politics in the face of novel and threat-
ening developments.    
I. Introduction 
Mireille Hildebrandt1 takes us on an exciting journey, full of unexpected turns, uncertain 
destinations, rough roads, dark tunnels, impassioned commentary, and thrilling vistas. 
Sometimes the same place seems to be re-visited without notice, and some stays are too 
short: if today is Tuesday, this must be due process; if Thursday, this must be morpholog-
ical computation. On Wednesday, which is inbetween, it was Japan. At the end of the 
journey, you realize that it was a grand tour, but how will you sort the photos? And what 
will you tell the children? 
To abandon the travel idiom: Hildebrandt casts new and brilliant light on an 
enormous range of topics and issues. She deploys areas of deep knowledge that needed to 
be rubbed against each other to make some sense of current and likely future develop-
ments of the digital world, and to cultivate some apprehension and gloom about the way 
things are going, unless—or perhaps even if—we can identify ways of retaining cherished 
values in the new and tempting world that we conspire to fashion. The values are public 
goods, including privacy, other freedoms, and the Rule of Law. They are eminently worth 
defending against those in the state, in companies and at home who would willfully or 
carelessly cast them aside. 
These values involve contested concepts, making it difficult to convince skeptics 
of their importance. The values require the re-invention, or at least the polishing, of their 
                                                 
* Charles D. Raab is Professorial Fellow in Politics and International Relations at the University of 
Edinburgh, and was previously Professor of Government. He is a Director of the Centre for Research into 
Information, Surveillance and Privacy (CRISP). 
1 Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law: Novel Entanglements of Law and 
Technology (2015). 
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protective armor, which demands imagination, skill, and organization. They are all prey to 
political and commercial pressures towards making us both more “secure” and profligate 
with our personal data, and making some wealthier. They are all vulnerable to the killing 
effect of what Postman (following Aldous Huxley) calls “amusing ourselves to death,”2 or, 
as Winner terms something of a similar sort, “technological somnambulism.”3 Winner 
writes that “the interesting puzzle in our times is that we so willingly sleepwalk through 
the process of reconstituting the conditions of human existence.”4 “In our times” meant 
the early 1980s: well before the Internet, social media, data-driven everything everywhere, 
online, offline and Hildebrandt’s “onlife”; but his observation remains true. It calls to 
mind the importance of understanding the politics of these situations, as Winner tried to 
do but as Hildebrandt somewhat inexplicably seems to underplay. This point will be the 
subject of a later section.  
II. Overview with Brief Comments 
The book has three parts: data-driven agency, threats of border control, and the end(s) of 
law. A few observations will be made on some of the chapters in passing, but more time 
will be given to selected points that arise from the book, or from the byways, parallel 
tracks and perhaps culs de sac to which they lead, in order to see how they could be taken 
further and in different directions, and to show how they might be developed to amplify 
the issues, although that further work must be deferred.  
Hildebrandt’s prefatory remarks tell us how she set out to write the book, convey-
ing its overarching idea and purpose: to expose the “new animism” of things and systems 
that foresee what we do and that pre-empt our intentions. This “mindless data-driven 
agency”5 is exercised by “smart” devices and robots, creating tensions and animosity be-
tween themselves (do they have selves?) and the humans they ostensibly serve. The 
implications for law—in particular, the Rule of Law—will be the book’s main concern. 
An Introduction gives a scenario of a fictional Diana and then Jacob and Lindsay, and 
their lives in the “onlife” world. This neologism signifies that “[o]ur current life world can 
no longer be described by dichotomizing online and offline. . . . Onlife singles out the fact 
that our ‘real’ life is neither on- nor offline, but partakes in a new kind of world that we 
are still discovering.”6 Thus the fictional humans and their servant robots (PDAs: person-
al digital assistants), who seem to know their mortal “masters” better than the latter do 
themselves, proceed through daily activities and tribulations wonderfully assisted by the 
learning algorithms and neural nets of their “smart” companions. Hildebrandt says: “We 
are facing a transformative life world, situated beyond the increasingly artificial distinction 
                                                 
2 Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business (1985). 
3 Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology 10 (1986). 
4 Id. 
5 Hildebrandt, supra note 1, at viii. 
6 Id. at 42. 
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between online and offline. To some degree, the upcoming onlife world thrives on artifi-
cial life forms, or at least on ‘things’ that seem to develop a life of their own. These 
‘things’ display a form of data-driven agency”7 and require “Big Data Space.”  
This agency is the subject of Part I, which shapes the main problem: how to regu-
late the information and communication infrastructure of the onlife world in order to 
protect humans from invisible manipulation and other practices, and from the concomi-
tant threat to rights and freedoms. Part II explores the “digital unconscious” of Diana’s 
onlife world as she develops relationships with her PDA, involving health diagnoses, for 
example, and the ubiquitous anticipation of her actions and behavior. Whereas the human 
world features double mutual anticipation of the self and others, in the onlife world, reci-
procity is lost: “[W]e have no idea how we are anticipated. We have no access to the inner 
workings of the software, we don’t know how the data we leak will correlate with profiles 
we don’t even know exist.”8 
This is several generations on from Packard’s9 shocking account of how the media 
subliminally manipulate our desires, based on psychological techniques, for commercial 
purposes; a later book raised the profile of privacy concerns around new technologies.10 
We might suppose that Diana, the huntress now hunted, and indeed haunted by dark 
forces that she cannot know or control, is even more vulnerable than the victims in Pack-
ard’s popular but prescient sociology, for she can neither comprehend nor apprehend the 
agent of her manipulation, which is neither amenable to reason nor accountable. The 
agent’s diagnoses and anticipation of her desires and behavior may even be more accurate, 
given the wealth of data it accesses and the sophistication of its algorithms. This may be 
the more dangerous to our rights and freedoms, too, given the ignorant blindness and ob-
solescence of the laws and regulatory instruments that were made for another era, but 
upon which we can only rely in the forlorn hope that they may still have some traction.  
Hildebrandt’s critical analysis seems light-years away from that fashionable demon-
ization of the advertising industry in midcentury America, where named advertising 
companies and corporate executives could be identified and sometimes made uncomforta-
ble over the exposure of their commercial stratagems. What was at stake then seems small 
now, in the light of what today’s developments portend; and PDAs have not yet been de-
signed to blush. Yet there is a very familiar ring to this apprehension about Diana’s 
situation. Descriptively or normatively, Jeremy Bentham—whether by way of Foucault or 
not—and Orwell have opened this window before. Here is Orwell: “There was of course 
no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. . . . You have to 
live—did live, from habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you 
made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.”11  
                                                 
7 Id. at 8. 
8 Id. at 67. 
9 Vance Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (1957). 
10 Vance Packard, The Naked Society (1964). 
11 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, at 5 (1949). 
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But—following Solove12—Hildebrandt eschews the “Big Brother” metaphor be-
cause it “does not clarify what is at stake in the world of large-scale databases and the 
detailed personal dossiers they make possible.”13 The new data-driven analytical capacity 
and agency overturns the (uneasy) settlement between technically based practices em-
ployed by business, government, and individuals among themselves, on the one hand, and 
values and rights, on the other.  
Differing from technological determinism, the concept of “affordance” is demon-
strably important in this analysis, as will be seen. Socio-technical infrastructures make 
things more or less possible for agents that use them. Hildebrandt interestingly inquires 
into this with reference to the advent of written text or script and its affordances, which, 
in Part III’s fascinating discussion, is shown to be integral with modern law. As infrastruc-
tures change, different affordances will affect the ability of law’s qualities to persist in the 
new onlife world. This is a major insight. The focus then moves to the onlife world’s 
threat to privacy, identity, freedom and the public good, and to an incisive analysis of so-
cial sorting, discrimination, autonomy, the presumption of innocence, and due process. 
Hildebrandt concludes this by shifting the question from that of one’s control of one’s 
personal data—as in standard vanilla-flavored privacy protection—to the less well-
rehearsed one of how we can control others’ inferential “reading” of our lives through 
our data.  
III. The Private and the Public: Lessons from Japanese Culture 
Travel broadens: we next find ourselves in Japan, where the culture provides different per-
spectives on privacy in the context of social relations that articulate social and moral spaces 
differently from the way Western societies do it. Japanese culture, in Hildebrandt’s example, 
constructs something “inbetween” humans and society. It constructs “a space, often depict-
ed as an emptiness that nourishes both the selves and the society they originate in and 
depend on.”14 Leaving Japan aside, the emptiness of inbetween may be filled by the state or 
by social institutions or groups to the detriment of individuals’ privacy, thus negating the 
self-preserving, self-enhancing, personal-identity-facilitative qualities of the inbetween. It 
may also be colonized by infrastructures of “computational decision-systems that pre-empt 
our intent,”15 by making inferences about us to which we have little access and over which 
we have little control. To be sure, the Japanese way of negotiating these relationships and 
metaphorical spaces is culturally structured, as Hildebrandt shows; the etiquette and strate-
gies of these negotiations give us a richer way of thinking about privacy. 
 The application of the lessons of these constructions is necessary to the extent 
that the premises upon which non-Japanese protective carapaces have been built are 
                                                 
12 Daniel Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age (2004). 
13 Hildebrandt, supra note 1, at 13. 
14 Id. at 114. 
15 Id. at 115. 
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showing serious signs of irrelevance. The dichotomous conventional way of thinking 
about privacy—you have it or you do not; or perhaps, on the other hand, you can give up 
some of it for more of something else—is bedeviled by these grands simplificateurs. These 
threadbare reflexes persist, repeated ad nauseam in the media and policy circles: do you 
want privacy or do you want security? collective security in the essential national interest, 
or individual privacy in your own interest or desire? very well, then, we will “strike a bal-
ance”: guess what? security wins.16 Hildebrandt’s particular target is the unhelpful and 
rather ignorant dichotomy between the “private” and the “public” that pervades percep-
tions and polices. It is in dire need of reconstruction to reflect the empirical findings and 
conceptual refinements contributed by social scientists and a certain kind of academic 
lawyer who comprehend social relationships and selves in a more nuanced and empirical 
way. Thus Regan,17 Schoeman,18 Altman,19 Cohen,20 Nissenbaum,21 and Steeves22 are 
among those who have shown us more fruitful and subtle ways of understanding privacy. 
Hildebrandt aptly invokes Arendt23 as a key figure in re-shaping our understanding of the 
private, social and public spheres towards a better grasp of the public goods and liberties 
that are at stake. 
New perspectives are thus gained: looking outward and upward from persons in 
their contexts, more than downwards from authoritative institutions that define our priva-
cy but also shape laws, codes and other ways of handling the tensions and conflicts 
surrounding who should know what, when, where, how and why about individuals. As 
Hildebrandt clearly explains, privacy and identity construction are closely intertwined in 
recent scholarship, provided that privacy means something more than solitude and isola-
tion, and that one’s notion of identity is also richer than that implied by the piece of 
plastic in your pocket.24 Boundaries are also a key concept, but one lesson from such an 
outlook is that the question of border control, as framed by the Japanese example, is over-
                                                 
16 Charles D. Raab, Security, Privacy and Oversight, in Security in a Small Nation: Scotland, Democracy, 
Politics (Andrew Neal ed., forthcoming 2017). 
17 Priscilla Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy (1995). 
18 Ferdinand Schoeman, Privacy and Social Freedom (1992). 
19 Irwin Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior: Privacy, Personal Space, Territory, Crowding 
(1975). 
20 Julie Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice (2012). 
21 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (2010). 
22 Valerie Steeves, Reclaiming the Social Value of Privacy, in Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity, 
Privacy and Identity in a Networked Society 191 (Ian Kerr et al. eds., 2009); see also Charles D. Raab, 
Privacy, Social Values and the Public Interest, in Politik und die Regulierung von Information [Politics and 
the Regulation of Information] 129 (Andreas Busch & Jeanette Hofmann eds., 2012) (Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft 46); Charles D. Raab, Privacy as a Security Value, in Jon Bing: En Hyllest / 
A Tribute 39 (Dag Wiese Schartum et al. eds., 2014). 
23 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (1958). 
24 Charles D. Raab, Identity: Difference and Categorization, in Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity, 
Privacy and Identity in a Networked Society 227 (Ian Kerr et al. eds., 2009). 
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taken by the perception of multiple borders involved in relationships and transactions, not 
just one dimension of being inside or outside; Goffman25 is a master of this genre, and his 
analysis of “face-work”26 is particularly apposite although arguably Western-culturally specific. 
IV. Inbetweenness and the Importance of Design 
This calls to mind, by way of similarities and differences, research in another field—
physical planning—in which the positioning of something “inbetween” conventional cat-
egories has had an important impact on practice and on the way we think about binaries, 
whether in real, social or metaphorical space. This work also engages with the concept of 
“affordance” if we focus upon tools and techniques aimed at providing safety in certain 
settings, and the same concept also has important implications for privacy. Thus New-
man’s understanding of “defensible space”27 looks at architecture and crime by 
considering how residents perceive and use spaces in terms of what is private and what is 
public. These two types are ambiguous, shaped by various legal and social interpretations 
that do not necessary pull in the same direction, but—as Newman shows—they do not 
exhaust the possibilities, and indeed provoke questions about their validity in differentiat-
ing spaces and the norms that govern them. What is more, their poor correspondence to 
the way residents interpret their milieu creates squalid and potentially or actually crime-
prone “no-man’s lands” in the interstices between the public and the private. Certain 
spaces are construed as outside anyone’s legitimate control, neither “mine” nor “theirs.” 
These hybrid spaces require greater definition and common understandings if they are to 
be salubrious and safe. Newman seeks to disambiguate the middle, creating surveilled 
spaces and investing them with normative value, making them less likely to be neglected 
or used for disorderly or criminal purposes. 
 Newman’s work is about crime reduction and public order at the level of the res-
idential community through rules, behavioral codes and sanctions that can be shaped by 
physical and social mechanisms to “design out crime.” The view that order has to do with 
certainty, predictability and unambiguity has affinities with Goffman’s analysis of the ac-
tual or potentially conflicting use of certain spaces traversed in everyday life, where the 
applicable rules are in doubt. Newman does not see his design strategy, or physical forms, 
as determinist. He writes: “The form of buildings and their arrangement can either dis-
courage or encourage people to take an active part in policing while they go about their 
                                                 
25 Erving Goffman, Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order (1971); Behavior in Public Places 
(1963); The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959). 
26 Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (1967). 
27 Oscar Newman, Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design (1973). Such analyses fed an 
initiative in law enforcement, architecture and urban planning towards “designing out crime.” The efficacy 
of design remedies was challenged for lack of clear evidence, but also for neglecting to tackle the roots of 
social disorder while tinkering with physical solutions. 
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daily business.”28 Regarding the interaction of spatial and social phenomena, he emphasiz-
es that “[a]rchitecture operates more in the area of ‘influence’ than control. It can create a 
setting conducive to realizing the potential of mutual concern. It does not and cannot ma-
nipulate people towards these feelings, but rather allows mutually benefitting attitudes to 
surface.”29 “Affordance” does seem a pertinent concept to guide and to understand the 
physical and social strategies for making space defensible. Areas are redefined to clarify 
the space inbetween the conventional binary ones, valorizing the social and individual 
surveillance that reinforces a kind of common “ownership” and therefore responsibility 
over the reconceptualized spaces. The physical and social reconfiguration of space pro-
vides affordances that may or may not be compatible with legal and other norms; this is a 
matter upon which Hildebrandt dwells in the different context of the infrastructure of the 
onlife world and how it might be designed to preserve privacy, non-discrimination, and 
the requirements of justice, legal certainty and purposiveness.  
“Defensible space” does not necessarily negate those desiderata, but it would be 
important to demonstrate the compatibility of the spatial design affordances with them, 
and of order with justice, as well as to engage with political and legal theory concerning 
ownership, appropriation, and the right to use without intimidation what is legally public 
space. The example of spatial design also ignores the juxtaposition and possible incompat-
ibility of the rules and norms that obtain in the residential area with those of the wider, or 
maximal society within which it nests. Neither this commentary, nor Hildebrandt’s writing 
on law and technology, would be the best place to wade into the thickets of “legal plural-
ism” and its roots in classical sociology and anthropology.30 But Pospisil’s31 concept of a 
multiplicity of legal levels and legal systems coexisting in the same “society” could provide 
insights into Newman’s construct, and arguably also into Hildebrandt’s field as well, in 
which the incarnation of the onlife world, or worlds—and their norms and rules—might 
be different in the plural domains and spheres of a society that she recognizes, and that 
she finely discusses in describing contextualism and border-control practices within Japa-
nese social relations.  
In the onlife world, what is human and what is artificial, and the boundary be-
tween them, grow blurred as these two erstwhile opposing forms themselves become 
ambiguous. Although this may differ from the apparent certainty of “public” and “pri-
vate” in the re-shaped spaces of housing estates, the spatial-design case may have value in 
thinking about the design of an onlife infrastructure that preserves the Rule of Law, and 
raises issues that could profitably be addressed within the subject-matter of Part III. 
There, she focuses crucially and insightfully upon law, its entanglements with technology 
                                                 
28 Id. at 3. 
29 Id. at 207 (emphasis in original).  
30 Baudouin Dupret, Legal Pluralism, Plurality of Laws, and Legal Practices: Theories, Critiques, and 
Praxiological Re-Specification, 1 Eur. J. Legal Stud. 1 (2007). 
31 Leopold Pospisil, Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Theory (1971); Legal Levels and Multiplicity of 
Legal Systems in Human Societies, 11 J. Conflict Resol. 2 (1967). 
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(importantly including writing), the question of technologically neutral law, and issues sur-
rounding the right to data protection and the initiative for using technical design to 
protect privacy and personal data. The spatial example points up the relevance of “af-
fordances” and “inbetween” as analytical handles in analyzing situations in which 
technologies, privacy and policy or practice merge These handles could enhance Hilde-
brandt’s approach in relation to the digital data context, for which she fears that crucial 
legal (and social and ethical) principles will be discarded if they hinder technological inno-
vation and scientific progress. It would be interesting to see the possibilities and 
limitations of reading “designing out crime” across to “designing in privacy/data protec-
tion” or “designing in law” (LPbD, or legal protection by design), when it comes to 
implementing data protection by design and default, for example.  
 That excursion cannot be taken here, but it would be instructive in view of the 
new EU Data Protection Regulation’s requirement of data protection by design and de-
fault.32 Beyond the final chapter’s stirring exhortation to inhabit the barricades and to take 
up the challenge, there is a need for detail about how the design of technological devel-
opments, seen as a regulatory policy option, can enhance justice, legal certainty and 
purposiveness, and how it beds down among the contradictory factors and forces beyond 
the design laboratory. Remarks on morphological computation and the design of robots 
make a promising start, and perhaps these can be elaborated and reoriented in subsequent 
writing. Hildebrandt enlists governments, lawyers and the ubiquitous “we” in the cam-
paign, but who should do what, separately and together, in what sequence, and who else, 
are not indicated; nor are the companies and technologists who would necessarily be in-
volved. These are institutional role equivalents of the social arrangements that Newman 
expects will work with spatial design, and they should be stipulated for Hildebrandt’s de-
sign solutions. And what about Diana, whether as unwitting subject or as contributing 
citizen, stimulated to arise from her vinous slumber and get stuck into the democratic po-
litical processes that Hildebrandt seems to suggest are the way to safeguard the Rule of 
Law and all its associated good things? 
Any regulatory strategy involves many actors, and it is important to specify and 
analyze the tools, actors and performances to be deployed in this design endeavor, as in 
the more mundane provision of data protection regimes.33 There is also a need to handle 
synergies and conflicts among the techniques and performances of this LPbD initiative, to 
understand the affordances of each contributory item and to exploit the affordances of 
their combination whilst reducing their conflicts. Radbruch’s34 conceptions of law’s three 
                                                 
32 Neither the Regulation nor its Recitals have robotics and the “smart” world specifically in their sights. 
33 Charles D. Raab & Bert-Jaap Koops, Privacy Actors, Performances and the Future of Privacy Protection, 
in Reinventing Data Protection? 207 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009); Charles D. Raab & Paul De Hert, 
Tools for Technology Regulation: Seeking Analytical Approaches Beyond Lessig and Hood, in Regulating 
Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes 263 (Roger Brownsword & Karen 
Yeung eds., 2008). 
34 See Hildebrandt, supra note 1, at 148-55 (citing Gustav Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, in The Legal 
Philosophies of Lisk, Radbruch, and Dabin 43 (Kurt Wilk trans., 2014 reprint) (1950)). 
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aims (justice, legal certainty and purpose), as endorsed by Hildebrandt, seem relevant here, 
perhaps in particular that of certainty, whether of the legal, the informal normative, or the 
psychosocial interactionist sort. Defensible-space design eliminates ambiguity and thus the 
uncertainty of what to expect when occupying or traversing more clearly designed areas, 
but there is a price to pay if the remedy for some people’s unsafety—the goal—displaces 
unsafety onto other people in terms of restricted liberty and privacy through increased 
surveillance: a point not considered by Newman. Whether this expectation of privacy is 
legitimate or “reasonable”—the term used in privacy discourse about situations involving 
“private” and “public” zones—especially if it means a reduction of values and rights 
through “social pressures,” would be worth debating, and also applying more specifically 
than Hildebrandt does, to human interactions with onlife infrastructures. Hildebrandt’s35 
earlier critical visit to the question of “balance” and “trade-off” is germane here but not 
deployed in the book, although the idiom of “balance” is itself questionable.36 With 
LPbD, she aims to pay “attention to the ‘resistability’ and contestability of the ensuing 
normativity [of an information and communications infrastructure],” and to “involve test-
ing how the configuration or design of the affordances can best serve the goals of justice, 
legal certainty and purposiveness.”37 These are very important undertakings. 
V. The Relevance of Resilience 
A further concept, “resilience,” could also be brought to bear upon the onlife world,38 and 
is implicit in Hildebrandt’s suggested solution. A related term, “resistance,” could be said 
to underlie the push-back exemplified by LPbD, but in the onlife world it might be 
doubted that this could amount to a popular front against the computational world; more 
an élite strategy enlisting lawyers and academics as the enlightened conscience of society. 
How could Diana act either to prevent or to mitigate the threats to her enjoyment of pri-
vacy and other rights, freedoms, and public goods, thus resiliently “bouncing back” to 
maintain or strengthen her position as a human agent in the face of stresses and shocks 
brought about by unknown and uncontrollable manipulative uses of data? Will the con-
venience and comfort furnished by mindless robots turn her into an unwitting “boiling 
frog,” with terminal consequences to her cherished values? Has she been “sleepwalking 
into a surveillance society,” or will she wake up, smell the coffee that the robot has 
brewed for her, and take steps to reassert control over her onlife? What preventative steps 
could be taken, and what mitigating steps if damage has been done? How does she learn 
                                                 
35 Mireille Hildebrandt, Balance or Trade-off? Online Security Technologies and Fundamental Rights, 26 
Phil. & Tech. 357 (2013). 
36 See Raab, supra note 16; Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. Political Phil. 
191 (2003); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977); Charles D. Raab, From Balancing to Steering: 
New Directions for Data Protection, in Visions of Privacy: Policy Approaches for the Digital Age 68 (Colin 
Bennett and Rebecca Grant eds., 1999). 
37 Hildebrandt, supra note 1, at 218. 
38 Charles D. Raab et al., Surveillance and Resilience in Theory and Practice, 3 Media & Comm. 21 (2015). 
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in order to improve her resilient performance? Can the finely observed strategies and tac-
tics described by Goffman, whereby people resiliently negotiate their everyday lives using 
situational artefacts and other persons, be updated in order to have purchase in the onlife 
world? This remains unexplored but intriguing territory.  
Resilience is indeed mentioned although not explicitly explored in the book: this is 
with regard to the vulnerability of computational systems through subversive penetrating 
attacks or breakdowns that threaten security and safety. For additional security, resilience 
strategies are needed against these dangers. Hildebrandt has already considered the draw-
backs to this elsewhere 39 and may do so in the future. But how people can be resilient in 
the face of a security agenda that drives the working of computational systems, and that 
threatens other human values, is not examined. Although she dismisses “surveillance” as 
an issue to be faced in this book, it is perhaps not so easily cast aside if we—and she does 
indeed—consider that the onlife world’s infrastructures and agents are deeply surveillant 
in their techniques and effects, and that “the onlife world can be designed in a way that 
allows for massive spying and subliminal nudging.”40  
It is a relief that this is not just another book cast in the idiom of “surveillance”—
although, if a term be needed, Clarke’s “dataveillance”41 would probably do. Nor is it just 
another book on “privacy,” although much of what is at stake has to do with how that 
right and value can be protected, and—despite the valid conceptual distinction between 
privacy and data protection—the practically focused concluding chapter is informed by 
the strategic idea behind data protection law’s “privacy by design.” But the book shares a 
concern with these more conventionally labeled works by showing how a corner has been 
turned in the development of “smart” systems and human-machine interactions based on 
massive data computation, and how “we” need to respond to fresh challenges. How is 
this political stance to be comprehended and empowered? 
VI. Towards Onlife Politics 
There is a further resilience story to tell in Hildebrandt’s account of mitigating or limiting 
the adverse consequences of data-driven agency, but it is not so clearly told at the level of 
the individual. Hildebrandt notes: “At some point we will become aware of the fact that 
we are being watched and anticipated by machines and we will try to figure out how the 
infrastructure ‘reads’ us and with whom it shares its knowledge of our preferences and of 
the risks we incorporate. One of the issues…is whether we will manage to figure this out . 
. . .”42 It would be worth exploring how the individual figures it out: by herself? by reading 
various media? through activists’ campaigning groups? through Snowden-like whistle-
blowing? It would also be worth considering what that newly enlightened individual might 
                                                 
39 Hildebrandt, supra note 35. 
40 Id. at 14. 
41 Roger Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 Commun. ACM 498 (1988). 
42 Hildebrandt, supra note 1, at 11 (emphasis in original). 
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do to protect herself, asserting her rights, freedoms, and claims to public goods, joining 
protests or boycotts, petitioning her elected representatives, and closing off certain ave-
nues of affordance in the robotic devices with which she interacts. But perhaps there is 
little she can do, little resilience or resistance she can exercise, and perhaps that is the si-
lent message of a book that turns to other valid opportunities for prevention or remedy. 
If that is the case, a politics of personal and social (in)action in the onlife world has to be 
written and, if it were possible to do so, even inform resilient practice. 
Despite the affordances of the sociologically aware analytical frameworks set out 
by Nissenbaum, Altman, Schoeman and others in understanding how privacy and bound-
ary transactions work, there is nothing in the Diana scenario that would cast light on how 
this might or might not be achieved in the onlife world. That could be a foregone oppor-
tunity to enrich the book’s discussion in a socio-political direction. The apathetic Diana is 
anything but an agent: she is seen interacting with hardly anyone outside the small circle 
of her workplace colleagues, her daughter, her ex-husband, and the head of her daughter’s 
school. She does not question the school’s monitoring of her daughter’s behavioral bio-
metrics for predictive purposes relating to diseases, nor her own gym’s recording, storing 
and communication of her biometric data. Diana seems to complain about nothing, and 
to blame no-one for anything. Instead, she relaxes with a glass of white wine and “drifts 
off into a pleasant oblivion.”43  
In cultural-theory terms, Diana is an isolate, and maybe also a fatalist in her onlife 
world if we knew more about her attitude to risk. Her oblivion is not only alcohol-
induced, but comes with the territory of her depoliticization, arguably induced by the 
amusement and convenience afforded by her technology-saturated world. If the scenario 
had shown her in the context of the public sector and the state’s intensive use of her data, 
she would likely have swallowed the justificatory propaganda that would have centered on 
the gain to her “security” and “safety,” playing on her fears, but not involving the active 
and social collaboration she would have performed had she resided in Newman’s defensi-
bly designed housing estate. Perhaps she has a touching faith in the state, the law and 
technology to keep her onlife world safe, liberal and under the Rule of Law. But Hilde-
brandt writes: “the extent to which the subliminal regulation takes place will depend on 
how we design these infrastructures and whether we find ways to inscribe legal protection 
into them.”44  
This could be reframed explicitly as a designated route that runs through collective 
political action—facilitated by the space afforded to it by privacy protection—engaging 
with the state and government, and through the law. Written law is by itself inadequate 
for regulation, and we must rely more on democratically and politically promoted design, 
which is taken up in the final chapter. But where in jurisdictional space, from the local to 
the global, these solutions are to be found, is not indicated. 
                                                 
43 Id. at 3. 
44 Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).  
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Thus Hildebrandt’s guided tour is not yet finished; we are not yet home and dry. 
A gap in this very rich analysis of law and the technologies under investigation is the poli-
tics of how we got to where we are and how we are to get out of it by reaching a solution 
that restores to a central position the threatened values and public goods. This is not just 
the mundane politics that is studied by political scientists and specialists in international 
relations, although those processes, institutions, ideas and behavioral forms are crucial to 
any understanding of how they would work in the onlife context. The study of politics is 
in large part the study of power and influence, decision- and policy-making, and the reso-
lution of conflict. Though these are instinct in Hildebrandt’s book, they are rather 
scattered. Even if they play an effective part where they appear, it is difficult to get a 
comprehensive sense of the politics of “smart” technologies and the end(s) of law. How 
technologies should be, or are, regulated is a major theme of the book. Regulatory policy 
as part of the study of politics, with an underpinning of models, concepts, comparisons, 
and analytical dimensions, could be brought to bear on delineating the limitations and 
perhaps affordances of the conventional array of regulatory strategies for the onlife world. 
In addition, and integral to the above, the study of politics involves political theory. 
There is an implicit political theory in Newman, but a political theory of the onlife world 
(and its rescue through design) is yet to be written, whether it be identical to, different 
from, or a distortion of, what we take to be the political theory informing liberal democ-
racy. Elements of this are already briefly glimpsed in Hildebrandt’s book in terms of the 
questions of discrimination, equality, liberty, authority, and others; in regard to the distri-
bution of power and the disempowerment that accompanies knowledge asymmetry about 
pre-emptive computing systems;45 to the relationship between law and the exercise of po-
litical power by the state; and to transparency and accountability. These could be 
consolidated to good effect. 
VII. Conclusion 
Reverting to the idiom of journeying: we have collected souvenirs that give views of the 
political, and that contribute to understanding and possibly to acting. If these have not 
(yet) crystallized into a rounded story from the standpoint of—speaking vaguely—the 
politics of the onlife world, it cannot be taken as forceful criticism of a book that never 
intended to do that kind of thing, and that has so many commendable qualities as a path-
breaking and insightful analysis of the subject. Yet there are further places to visit and sto-
ries to be told, of which the political one—in the broad sense—seems a likely vehicle for 
applying analytical frames, concepts and methods drawn from a different discipline. Can 
such a political science and political theory be written, perhaps before robots get together 
and petition for voting rights? If this is Friday, it must be . . . .  
                                                 
45 Lukes’s theorization of the concept of power is apposite here. See Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (1974).  
